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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to explore the
relationship between the speaker in Whitman's poem, "Song of
Myself," and the self who is represented or "sung" within
the context of the poem.
Looking at the text, the question
arises whether the work is a predication of the speaker that
encompasses the full range of his experience, or whether the
poem fails to address some aspect of the poet's subjective
being.
Specifically, this question arises when we read
Whitman's various assertions of an identity that is
"withheld" from language - assertions that appear even as
Whitman engages in an extended reconstruction of himself.
The exploration of this relationship between the
speaking and the spoken selves in "Song of Myself" proceeds
with the proposal that the reader adopt an understanding of
subjectivity that will take into account the fissure between
the poet who objectifies himself in words and the poet who
is thus represented.
Such an understanding of subjectivity
is proposed in lieu of the more conventional view that the
human individual is accurately portrayed through the neutral
medium of language.
In particular, this alternative view of
subjectivity is proposed in accordance with Jacques Lacan's
theoretical formulations of selfhood and its involvement in
language.
Lacan's psychoanalytic vocabulary is employed in
an effort to show how Whitman's poem conveys the not
entirely representable presence of the language-using
subj e c t .
As a result of this study, "Song of Myself" comes to be
seen as a performative work of literature whose significance
transcends its predicative dimension.
The work is
transformed from a poem "about" the poet's self to a
rehearsal of both the articulable and the inarticulable
aspects of subjective being.

"SONG OF MYSELF" AND THE DIVIDED SUBJECT

A remarkable division operates throughout the text of
"Song of Myself," problematizing what is likely to be our
understanding of the speaker and the way in which his words
relate to his subjective experience.

From the opening line

of the poem, "I celebrate myself, and sing myself," we are
invited to perceive the work as an exuberant description of
the poet, a subjecting of the subject to language that
results in a topographical re-creation of the psyche.
think to ourselves:
Walt Whitman.

We

these words refer back to the poet,

As we work our way from one section of the

poem to the next, we begin to revise our expectations about
the predicative scope of the poem, seeing that the identity
of the speaker exceeds the discrete awareness of a
particular poet and inhabits a diverse array of situations
and personal relations.

We find that the self of which this

poem is the song ranges from "Farmer, mechanic, artist,
gentleman, sailor, quaker," to "the hounded slave that flags
in the race."1

This permeability of the subject and

everything "other" need not, however, change our way of
thinking about the reflective power of language in relation
to Walt Whitman.

Apparently, we have merely to expand our

conception of the speaker so that this poem (entitled "Walt
Whitman" for eleven years prior to being renamed "Song of
Myself") becomes the delineation of a "kosmos" rather than
of a self-contained awareness-2 The speaker remains an
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object of poetic representation, but with his identity
portrayed as multifarious and unrestricted by the
individuality of experience.
The difficulty with our presupposition that "Song of
Myself" captures and re-creates through language the very
speaker in the poem (whether as a thirty-seven-year old man
in perfect health, or the immortal "mate and companion of
the people"2) becomes apparent when we read that, in effect,
a dimension of that speaker's subjective experience resides
on the periphery of his song, evading the restless and
diverse representation of people and places that we come to
think of as the poet's consciousness.

We first encounter

this division in subjectivity when we read section four of
the poem,

where Whitman posits the "Me myself" who stands

"apartfrom the

pulling and hauling" of his surroundings.

The sickness of one of my folks or of myself,
or ill-doing or loss or lack of money,
or depressions or exaltations,
Battles, the horrors of fratricidal war, the
fever of doubtful news, the fitful events;
These

come to me days and nights and go from
me again,
But they are not the Me myself.

Apart from the pulling and hauling stands
what I am,
Stands amused, complacent, compassionating,
idle, unitary....
The reserved and idle "Me myself" stands aloof in the midst
of the world's activity, witnessing and waiting instead of
allowing himself to be caught up in "the fitful events" that
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surround him.

Such aloofness, we may notice, contrasts

sharply with the self who is depicted in the preceding
section of the poem.

There we read, "I am satisfied - I

see, dance, laugh, sing," - statements that portray the
speaker as one who is engaged in the world around him and
who derives fulfillment from his activities, rather than as
the waiting and withdrawn "Me myself."

How, we may ask, do

we account for this disjunction in the self of Whitman's
poem?

Is there an understanding of subjectivity we should

adopt in lieu of the conventional belief that the self is a
unified being, capable of complete representation in
language (or, metaphorically speaking, of complete
participation in - rather than aloofness from - the lively
tenor of its re-creation)?
The need for a model of subjectivity that, when we read
"Song of Myself," allows us to appreciate the divided state
of the speaker and his partial habitation on the edge of his
own self-portrayal is reinforced in section 25 of the poem,
where Whitman addresses speech in the abstract:

"My final

merit I refuse you, I refuse putting from me what I really
am,/ Encompass worlds, but never try to encompass me...."
What kind of a poem purports to be a song and a celebration
of the poet's self, even as that self denies the embrace of
language?

Indeed, what kind of a subject undertakes a

verbal fabrication of his identity (and devotes the better
part of a lifetime to revising it), when ultimately his
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identity lies beyond the scope of speech?

Is the speaker in

Whitman's poem (Whitman himself, we will presume) capable of
being absorbed into the representation of his existence?
And if not, does this non-absorption signify a defect in the
poem?

These questions and more beg to be addressed when we

read these lines in section 25 of "Song of Myself."
Moreover, such questions point to the need for an
elucidation of the paradigmatic role of the subject in
Whitman's poem - an elucidation that does not settle for a
grasp of Whitman's self as merely inconsistent, but as
theoretically integrated and capable, if not of resolving,
then of stabilizing and preserving the contradictions in the
text.
The following passage in section 15 epitomizes the
disjunction we have identified in Whitman's poem thus far,
showing us in a concentrated scenario the problematic
dynamics of this literary self-re-creation.
The city sleeps and the country sleeps,
The living sleep for their time, the dead
sleep for their time,
The old husband sleeps by his wife and the young
husband sleeps by his wife,
And these tend inward to me, and I tend outward
to them,
And such as it is to be of these more or less
I am,
And of these one and all I weave the song of
myself.3
Apparently, we are to understand the poet's being as a
complex and seamless web of experience, spanning the diverse
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situations of the old and the young, the living and the
dead.

We are presented with the poet's psyche as a

revelatory collapse of the distinction between self and
other, as though the separation were an artificial
categorization and blotting out of awareness.

The very fact

of our being presented with this view, however, creates a
rift in the seamless continuity of experience that is
depicted as the poet's self or as that of which he is - a
rift in which is generated the tension between the self who
is portrayed in words, and the subject who "weaves" the poem
without laying claim to an identity that can be taken up
into the fabric of the work.

Initially, the first person

emerges in these lines as a presence that is almost
indistinguishable from the wide-ranging catalog of sleepers,
with the reciprocal attraction of the speaker and the
various figures he describes suggesting that the distinction
between self and other is in fact illusory.

The second line

in which the "I" appears, however, qualifies the suggested
unity of the poet and the sleepers with the words "more or
less," thereby hinting at a progressive solidification of
the subject apart from the variegated fabric that
constitutes the song of his identity.

The final line of

this passage (a line that actually punctuates a very long
list of characters and events) completes the separation of
the first person and the stuff of which his being is
ostensibly woven, creating a space in which an already

existing self can labor in the construction of his self.
Again, we are brought back to the question of how and indeed
whether the speaker in "Song of Myself” can be incorporated
into his representation of himself.

And, again, we must ask

what view of subjectivity can account for the misalignment
of the speaker and what is spoken, given that both are meant
to designate the place of subjective being.
Gay Wilson Allen argues that the poet in "Song of
Myself" can be identified on two levels.

The pastiche of

animate and inanimate entities that occupies much of the
poem is, according to Allen, the "persona" that Whitman
adopts in his endeavor "imaginatively and compassionately"
to become whatever appears in his field of vision.4

The

suggested unity of the poet and various sleepers he
enumerates,

for example, constitutes a volatile and

kaleidoscopic dimension of Whitman's presence in "Song of
Myself," as does his representation of (and tending toward)
a vast array of men and women in general.

Allen writes,

...the poet (or his "persona")
identifies himself with other people sometimes even with inanimate things or
abstractions - by such strong empathy
that he finds himself to be, for the
moment, that person or thing.
Not only
does he see all people in himself, but
he imaginatively and compassionately
becomes each of these in turn as they
come into the focus of his sympathy....
As a consequence of this omnivorous
identification, the "persona" of "Song
of Myself" undergoes many metamorphoses
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In contrast to the volatile persona described here,
Whitman's presence in "Song of Myself" also consists of an
unchanging identity that underlies and anchors the
subjective metamorphoses of the "compassionate" speaker.

In

other words, says Allen, the many incarnations of the poet
contrast with a single, basic self, serving as mere "changes
of garments" that do not alter the character or the
experience of this fundamental identity.6

This fundamental

self, moreover, should be understood as Whitman the poet,
the man who spent most of his adult life writing and re
writing Leaves of Grass.

The author who molds his

representation of himself and is occasionally inserted into
the text of "Song of Myself" with a direct comment to the
reader is the true identity beneath the changing,
contradictory persona we encounter in the poem.

The

persona, on the other hand, is a created and derivative
presence "whose visit with his reader must soon end with the
last line of the poem,"7 even as we forget whether we are
listening to the invented voice of the persona or the
originary voice of the poet.
Richard Chase interprets the subject in "Song of
Myself" as indicative of "the paradox of 'identity.'"8

In

explaining what he means by "the paradox of 'identity',"
Chase divides the subject into categories of social and
individual or private experience.

The poet, in other words,

has a "political" and a "natural" dimension to his identity:

"on the one hand, he is integral in himself, unique, and
separate; on the other hand, he is equal to, or even the
same as, everyone else."9

Whitman's poem is a celebration

of the "dialectic opposition" between "the simple separate
person" and the "vast cosmic democracy" of which every
separate person is a component.

The success of the poem, in

fact, rides on the tension and the perpetual reinstatement
of this opposition, as does the success of Whitman's poetry
in general.10

The paradox of a simultaneously private and

political existence, moreover, accounts for the subjective
duality that Allen explains with the terminological division
between the poet and his persona.

Chase maintains that the

ability of Whitman's self "to assume the imprint of any
'identity' it wishes without regard to the barriers of space
or time" propels the poem as an ongoing "transformation of
the simple separate person into the democratic en-masse or
community of comrades...."11

The self that undergoes

transformation is the individual, natural self, while the
many faces it assumes belong to the world of "society and
convention.1,12

"The motif of 'Song of Myself' is the self

taking on a bewildering variety of identities and with a
truly virtuoso agility extricating itself from each one."13
The identities adopted signify the range of experience that
constitutes the body politic, while the being who does the
actual adopting and self-extricating is the "What I am" or
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the natural, private person who underlies collective codes
and obligations.
In My Soul and I, David Cavitch argues that Whitman
tries to incorporate everything "other" into his personality
by writing poems like "Song of Myself."

Because of his

pervasive egomania, "Whitman could not trust analogous
extensions of himself beyond his subjective circle.

He

needed...to draw everything into the immediate context of
his personality."14

Cavitch attributes such egomania to

Whitman's youthful relationship with his mother when he felt
dominated and "unstable in his sense of self," and to
Whitman's consequent effort as a mature poet to move away
from the tenuousness and the isolation of his individual
perspective and attain "contrasting viewpoints (that) are
... harmoniously aligned."

Cavitch also suggests that the

catalogs of unconnected images and events portrayed as the
poet's psyche in "Song of Myself" is a reflection of
childhood experience generally, when "sensations (are) never
simply internal events" but are "confused" with external
surroundings.15

Regardless of whether he sees Whitman's

poetic incorporation of the world as a consequence of
specific historical circumstances or as the reflection of a
universal childhood mentality, Cavitch interprets the figure
who weaves the poem and the many images of subjectivity
depicted in the work as different aspects of a single
"highly syncretized personality."16

"Song of Myself" is
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understood as a contrapuntal work in which the represented
and the language-using selves complement and displace one
another; any disjunction between the two is subsumed and
reconciled by viewing the text as an extension of the poet.
The figure who creates the text and the multi-faceted self
who is created in the text are equally reducible to a
conception of Whitman's psyche as omnivorous and fixated on
an early stage of its development.

Throughout the poem, the

author's "personal sense is replaced by the fragments and
the flux into which he himself is dissolved," thereby
generating an "internal conversation" in the work that
mirrors Whitman's own fluctuation between a personal sense
and the nostalgia for his childhood experience of unity with
the world.17
Each of these interpretations of the subject in "Song
of Myself" acknowledges as worthy of consideration the
distinction between the self who is represented in a collage
of images and perspectives, and the "what I am" or the
detached, equanimous presence who resists the flow of
images.

In the preceding critics' formulations, this

distinction unfolds as the difference between the poet and
his persona; the opposition between the private individual
and the socialized, conventional self; and the device of an
egomaniac - the figure who weaves the poem and employs the
fiction of unity with all things (the represented self) in
order to satisfy the demands of his own convoluted psyche.

Each of these interpretations, however, fails to take into
account the problematic dimension of the speaking subject
(Allen's poet and Chase's natural individual) and his
refusal, in the context of a literary work that ostensibly
celebrates subjective experience, to "put" from himself what
he "really" is or to disclose his "final merit" to speech.
We need to move beyond these critics' dualities and address
the paradox of the subject who formulates his own being in
words while simultaneously designating the point from which
he speaks (or from which he "puts" himself) as inaccessible
to language.

We must formulate an understanding of

subjectivity able to explain the gap between the
representing and the represented selves in Whitman's poem,
and we must ask what role language plays in the dynamics of
this hiatus.
The interpretations of "Song of Myself" that we have
examined here may, in essence, be understood as explications
of only one aspect of a highly ambiguous poem, the
significance of which is epitomized in its title.

Allen,

Chase and Cavitch all focus on Whitman's song of himself as
though the work were strictly a song "about" the poet, a
work whose function is primarily predicative and
descriptive.

The "of" in "Song of Myself," however, does

not simply mean "about."

Whitman's poem is a song by the

self as well as a song about the self, meaning that the work
pertains equally to the figure who is represented in the
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poem, and to the figure who weaves the poem while eluding
representation - like an anonymous author who, strangely
enough, has a byline.

It is important that we recognize

"Song of Myself" as a work that captures the tension between
the subject who is capable of being depicted and the subject
from whom self-depiction originates.

More precisely, we

must acknowledge that the capturing of this tension is not
itself just an act of representation, but a performance or a
dramatization of subjective experience, both at the center
and on the periphery of language. We must begin to think of
words as objectifying a "reality" of "things"

(if we can

call them things at this stage) in such a way as to distance
the self from the "true" self as an object of articulation.
When we begin to think of words in this way, then Whitman's
refusal to give his "real" self to speech can be seen
simultaneously to repudiate and affirm the identificatory
process (i.e., self-predication) through which the self is
lost.

Ostensibly, Whitman's refusal repudiates the power of

self-representation.

But the fact that this refusal takes

place in language - and, indeed, in an extensive work of
self-referentiality - indicates that the poet is enacting
the inextricable and irreconcilable positions of the subject
as an inarticulable being and a reified, representable
being.

Whitman's refusal to "put" from himself what he

"really" is may in fact be ranked among what Shoshana Felman
refers to as "statements (that) function not as simple
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truths but as performative speech acts."18

The refusal

functions not only on the level of its explicit or alleged
meaning, but draws into play the contextual and occasional
significance of the song in which it occurs.

Continuing

along this line of argument, moreover, we find that the
performative dimension of Whitman's refusal of his "final
merit" to speech is intensified by the positioning of that
rejection at the near-center of the poem.

The appearance of

this refusal in section 25 of "Song of Myself" illustrates
as it were the disjunction between the spoken and the
speaking selves and the concomitant impossibility of the
"whole" self stepping into the spotlight of representation.
When we read section 25 of Whitman's work, we are in effect
reading the inability of the subject to occupy its own
center stage.
If we wish to approach the problem of the divided
subject in Whitman's text while taking into consideration
the simultaneous linguistic embodiment and evasiveness of
that subject, then we are sure to find that Jacques Lacan's
theoretical formulations about subjectivity and language are
useful to us as we move from one section of the poem to
another and piece together a paradigm of experience.
Lacan's writings are in fact quite relevant to the questions
we have asked about "Song of Myself."

This French

psychoanalyst writes about the self as a reflexive being who
is repeatedly displaced through its acts of identification
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and reflection, thereby suggesting a perspective that
pertains to the one we have assumed here in our initial
questions about "Song of Myself."

The subject of which

Lacan writes is, strictly speaking, the subject of
psychoanalytic investigation, or the analysand whose
conscious and unconscious mind structures the dynamics of
the talking session in which "the patient's Word" reigns
supreme.19

Lacan's researches in the psychoanalytic field,

however, are germane to our investigation of the subject in
Whitman's poem because of their more general ramifications
for the relationship of the subject to language.

From

Lacan's writings we can derive a vocabulary that will help
us to address the problem of Whitman's text precisely
because Lacan's work demonstrates the divided nature of
subjective experience and the centrality of discourse - not
merely in the analyst's office - but in the world at
large.20
Before we proceed with our examination of Lacan, we
should acknowledge that much of his work consists of a re
reading of Freud.

In

that concerns us most

fact, the aspect of Lacan's writing
(that is, his

investigations into the

divided and displaced nature of subjectivity) can be traced
directly to Freud's analytical researches.
Coward and John Ellis

note, Lacan's

'given' of the unity of the

subject

As Rosalind

"refutation of(the)
in traditional

psychology... is based on a re-reading of Freud that
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radically subverts the notion of the unified subject...."21
The "given" of which Coward and Ellis speak is exactly the
concept of subjectivity that characterizes both American
psychology generally, and the literary researches of the
Whitman critics we have identified.22
Freud lies at the heart of Lacan's departure from all
theories of unified subjectivity primarily because Freud
devotes much of his intellectual curiosity to the separation
of consciousness and the unconscious, and to the status of
each in relation to one another.23

The topography of the

unconscious is, in particular, set forth in Freud' work on
dreams, where the dividedness of the subject is established
with an elucidation of certain primary mechanisms in the
psyche.
Freud himself claimed that his work on dreams
contained the essential concepts of his
discoveries concerning the unconscious.
In the
description of the elements of timelessness, lack
of contradiction, condensation and displacement in
dreams, Freud uncovered the mechanisms of the
unconscious system.24
At the same time Freud articulates the primary processes of
the unconscious, he also brings to light the controlling
function and the distributing effect of consciousness.
Conscious thought comes to be seen as the reining-in of
psychic energy; ego emerges from a scenario of displacement
and condensation signaling the possibility of such
regulation.
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Waking thought, judgement, reasoning,
logic, all belong to the secondary
processes (of the conscious mind).
Unlike primary processes, where
psychical energy flows freely by means
of displacement and condensation, in the
case of secondary processes, energy
moves in a more controlled way.
Satisfaction is delayed while the mind
tries out different ways to
satisfaction.
This regulatory function
is made possible by the construction of
the ego.
This regulatory function
results from the process of the
construction of the ego and its world of
objects. . . .25
Freud's re-working of the human individual into primary
and secondary categories of psychic being prepares the way
for Lacan's presentation of the subject as divided along the
lines of its own linguistic capability.

Lacan thrusts

conscious and unconscious experience onto a horizon where
the use of language structures the mind of the user (shapes
it into consciousness), while the state of being that
precedes the structuring effect of language (that is to say,
the unconscious)

is repressed and buried with the

acquisition of speech, never to be known again except in a
fictional or mythical re-creation of its features.26

Thus

Lacan reads Freud's mechanisms of the unconscious
linguistically:
metonymy.

condensation becomes metaphor, displacement

Because consciousness functions solely in

language, because the unconscious designates an area of the
psyche that precedes the use of words, we can never know the
unconscious for what it "is;" its presence is registered
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only by the effects of linguistic substitution and
concealment.

Thus Lacan is forced to assign a mythical or

"made-up" status to his interpretation:
Lacan produces a mythical hypothesis of
the child in its existence before it
becomes a language-using member of
society.
This myth can only ever be
mythical precisely because any knowledge
that one has of the processes pre
existing language... are known only
through language with its symbolic
relations.28
The myth with which Lacan reconstructs the pre-linguistic
psyche is a state in which the human being does not
differentiate himself from other objects as a distinct
entity.

Instead, "the myth suggests a state dominated

purely by the drives, that is, by pressures or forces
towards certain objects."29

Prior to his initiation into a

system of signifiers, the individual experiences a "constant
flux of instinctual energy across (his) body" in relation to
the external world30, rather than a sense of himself as a
substantive and self-contained being who interacts with
other substantive objects.

This pre-verbal state, in which

the individual is like a "broken egg spreading without
hindrance in all directions," comes to be known throughout
Lacan's writings as the unconscious.
however,

Strictly speaking,

"the unconscious is a concept forged on the trace

of what operates to constitute the subject," - meaning that
the unconscious "is" not the egg-like state from which the
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discrete human being emerges, but a verbal fabrication of
that state as we imagine it to be from across the
irreparable divide of speech.31
The crossing of this great divide into a universe of
signifiers and the accompanying formation of the reified
self or the ego is, in fact, a divide unto itself.

The

passage from instinctual awareness to the conceptual
ordering of oneself and everything other consists, in the
first place, of a splitting apart in the subject.

With his

emergence from the unconscious,
the subject undergoes a separation or
splitting in order to find a signifying
place from which to represent itself,
even if only by means of a 'stand-in'
(or a sign). For in order to use
language, it is necessary that the
subject finds himself at the axis of the
division signifier/signified, taking up
a position in regards to meaning.32
This split in the subject is a harbinger of the life-long
mediating effect of language; it marks a space within the
self where the crystallization or hypostatization of the
spoken first occurs.

As Anika Rifflet-Lemaire writes,

"Language in effect establishes mediate relationships as
opposed to immediate relationships in which there is no
distance between the self and things, between self and
others."35

Language, we may add, establishes these mediate

relationships first through this initial paradigmatic split
in the subject; it initiates a lasting division between a
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repressed self whose identity is constituted through
discourse.

In other words, we find ourselves working with a

"division of being revealed in psychoanalysis between the
self, the innermost past of the psyche, and the subject of
conscious discourse, behaviour and culture."34
The division between self and self that we have just
examined is otherwise identified by Lacan as the
construction of the ego.35

The construction of the ego is

characterized by two dominant "moments," both of which
indicate the progressive solidification of the subject and
his departure from instinctual flux.

The first of these two

moments in Lacan's history of the subject is the "mirrorphase," while the second of these moments is referred to as
the "castration complex."36

The construction of the ego as

a distinct being with a socio-cultural dimension can be
traced in the passing of these moments.
The idea of a mirror-phase in the development of the
subject comes from Lacan's observation of "the infant's
fascination with his mirror image."

Lacan interprets this

fascination as "a transformation which takes place in the
subject when he assumes an image," and as that subject's
first step toward an integrated view of himself.37
mirror-phase
is to be seen as the 'spatialization'
necessary for a position in language by
which the subject is able to
communicate.
For the mirror-phase is
seen by Lacan to be the moment at which

The
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the infant's first movement towards a
unified sense of itself is set in
motion.
Prior to this, the infant is
dominated by the constant flux of
38
instinctual energy across its body.
•

•

•

While the mirror-phase marks the dawning of the subject's
awareness of himself as a holistic being, that phase is
based on the subject's perception of his own image, not as
the reflection of a stable and repeatedly identifiable
presence, but rather as a duplication into which the
•

•

consciousness of the subject collapses.

3

9

*

That is to say,

subjectivity in its mirror-phase is not yet characterized by
the conceptual positioning through which the self and
everything other is arranged in a constellation of ontic
stability.

The visionary duality that characterizes the

mirror-phase, moreover, infiltrates the relationship of the
subject with his mother.

The infant, at this stage,

experiences a speculary fascination with the mother in which
his own sense of himself is constituted, in part, through
the collapse of his identity into that maternal other.40
The subject is as yet incapable of understanding himself and
his mother as separate individuals.

The mirror-phase,

finally, should be understood as the first step in the
socialization of the infant.

For "the mirror-phase shows

the production of the possibility of a unified subject,
a possibility which is necessary for
establishing social communication:
there has to be a subject in order for
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there to be a subject of a
proposition.41
If the mirror-phase is characterized by the collapsing or
fluid duality of the subject's consciousness and that which
he perceives, creating in effect a certain unity of the
subject and the image, then the castration complex marks the
point at which unity is frustrated and the difference
between the subject and the image is established.

The

castration complex is the point at which "the imaginary
unity of the mirror-phase and the fictional direction of the
ego has to be broken by the fact of difference...."42

As

Freud first articulated it, the castration complex is the
moment at which the (male) child realizes he cannot achieve
identification or unity with the mother.

(Here we are

reminded of David Cavitch's interpretation of Whitman's
egomania as, in part, a consequence of his relationship with
his mother.)

Ultimately, this complex is the child's

realisation that the penis cannot be used as an expression
of his desire for his mother."43

The subject's fascination

with his apparent counterpart is interrupted by the
prohibition of incest, which forces a recognition of
difference and separation where the subject was previously
unable to distinguish between himself and the other
confronting him.44

This recognition of difference acts as a

turning point in the development of the psyche.

For this

recognition has "a structural function operating as the
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start of the establishment of a series of differences."45
The moment thus completes - both in Freud's writings and in
Lacan's - the subject's initiation into "the cultural
order," where the differential quality of language is key to
the regulating and restrictive nature of social existence.
The prohibition of incest and its function of
differentiation is in fact "the all-important condition for
the inauguration of human culture," structuring as it does
the marriage relations from which all other social
institutions derive.46
In our reading of "Song of Myself," we will find that
two categories of experience introduced by Lacan in
conjunction with the mirror-phase and the castration complex
are very useful for tracing the presentation of subjectivity
in Whitman's poem.

These categories or registers of

experience do not refer solely to the specific historical
circumstances of the mirror-phase and the castration
complex, but instead indicate the way in which these socalled moments shape the subject and structure his existence
as an adult.
The experiential category that is associated with the
mirror-phase is the Imaginary, a register which, as Fredric
Jameson points out, "derives from the experience of the
image," and whose "spatial and visual connotations" we are
meant to retain.47

Rifflet-Lemaire explains that the

essence of the Imaginary is the "dual relationship" or the
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"reduplication in the mirror," with this duality being "an
immediate opposition between consciousness and its other in
which each term becomes its opposite and is lost in the play
of reflections."A8

The Imaginary, as it persists in adult

experience, is the sensation of flux that characterizes the
collapse of clear-cut distinctions.

Specifically,

"the

imaginary concerns the intuitive lived experience of the
body," or "lived experiences which overlap, accumulate and
overflow into infinite successions of sensorial, emotional
and conceptual jugglings."A9

But the Imaginary also

persists in adult experience, not just as the intuited play
of reflections among conflated distinctions, but as the
delusive insistence on symmetrical, oppositional patterns of
thought that can be traced directly to the "logic" of mirror
images.50

Jameson,

for example, argues that ethical

judgements, with their dependence on the polar distinction
between "good" and "bad," are essentially Imaginary
constructs.51

Likewise, as Shoshana Felman explains, the

traditional concept of consciousness as an internal dialogue
from which arises a stable identity can, in fact, be traced
back to the symmetrical mechanics of the mirror-phase and
the functioning of the Imaginary.52
Self-reflection, the traditional
fundamental principle of consciousness
and of conscious thought, is what Lacan
traces back to "the mirror stage," to
the symmetrical dual structure of the
Imaginary.
Self-reflection is always a
mirror reflection, that is, the illusory
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functioning of symmetrical reflexivity,
of reasoning by the illusory principle
of symmetry between self and self as
well as between self and other; a
symmetry that subsumes all difference
within a delusion of a unified and
homogenous individual identity.53
The category of experience that is associated with the
castration complex is identified by Lacan as the Symbolic.
The Symbolic, in effect, covers all of society's linguistic,
socio-cultural and logico-mathematical codes of
signification.54

The Symbolic refers to language, and to

all the other codes in society that depend on the subject's
ability to recognize differences in more subtle conceptual
arrangements than that of reflexivity.

In other words, the

Symbolic is the structure "through which human exchanges
become possible and meaningful, in the accumulation of
codes."55

This category of experience is the order through

which sociality appears in its profound identity with the
differential, relational network of language.56

In the

experience of the individual, this register is the inter
human structure into which he is born, and through which he
learns to identify himself57 - whether as a creature of God,
a member of the perfect race, or a being constituted across
the spectrum of the Imaginary and the Symbolic.

On a very

particular scale, the Symbolic refers to the ability and the
inclination of the poet to poeticize, as well as to the
cultural artifact that he produces.
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Before we proceed with our analysis of "Song of Myself"
in light of what Lacan has to offer, we should examine our
expectations about what Whitman's poem may exhibit if
subjectivity is to be understood in terms of the Imaginary
and the Symbolic.

In particular, we should not assume that

"Song of Myself" exhibits a readily definable or even
unambiguous pattern of transition from the Imaginary to the
Symbolic, and back again.

As a delineation and a

celebration of the self, the poem would fall short of its
title if Whitman did not present himself as a complex and
multivocal being - indeed, a contradictory being.

For in

contrast to the schematic outlines of the subjective orders
produced by theory, the experience of these orders in time
make them appear contradictory.

("Do I contradict myself?/

Very well then I contradict myself,/ (I am large, I contain
multitudes.)")

The subject (both in history and in

Whitman's poem) is not determined by the Symbolic, the
Imaginary or, for that matter, the unconscious, as isolated
aspects of human existence; rather, "the Symbolic, the
Imaginary, and the Real (i.e., the unconscious) co-exist and
intersect in the subject" simultaneously.58
"song"

As for the

(which is itself constitutive of the subject), it

poses a certain difficulty common to all texts,
a difficulty (that) derives from the way
that Imaginary elements may enter the
Symbolic as signs, signifiers, and
symbols, and, conversely, from the way
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that symbolic elements may be reduced to
Imaginary functions.59
In light of the problem in "Song of Myself" that we
articulated at the beginning of this paper (namely, the
problem of the disjunction between the speaking and the
spoken selves, and the meaning of a poem that can never
fulfill its goal of self-predication), and in light of
Lacan's ideas about the nature of subjectivity, it becomes
apparent that we should read Whitman's poem as a performance
(in the spirit of Shoshana Felman's "performative speech
acts") of the following Lacanian propositions:

"I think

where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think," and "I
am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought."60

The

"I" in Whitman's poem who thinks (and speaks) about himself
and who works to represent himself in a variety of ways
should, in other words, be understood as the self who
refuses his "final merit" to speech, or who refuses to "put"
from himself what he "really" is.

This "I" is not where the

poet situates himself in the poem in an array of forms and
stances.

The "I" who is the plaything of the poet's thought

and speech, meanwhile, is the figure represented throughout
the poem, whether as a "kosmos" or as a "comrade of
raftsmen."
We will recall that Allen, Chase and Cavitch each
identify an "I" in "Song of Myself" who ultimately resides
outside the poem's depiction of a multifaceted subject.
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Allen speaks of a poet who manipulates his persona, Chase of
a private, natural individual who contrasts with the social
self, and Cavitch of an individual who uses language to
satisfy his egomania.

When, however, we identify an "I" who

is not where the poet situates himself in the poem, we are
not - unlike these critics - identifying the "I" who
maintains a real presence outside the language of the poem.
On the contrary, we are proposing that the withheld self who
generates the entire poem can be found only within the
language of Whitman's text.

Even while the hidden being who

refuses his final merit to speech assumes the role of an
absent, nonrepresentable subject, that hidden being assumes
such a role in "Song of Myself" only through the
representational capacity of language.

The drama of

Whitman's poem, in other words, lies precisely in this
tension of language, where the weaving of the depicted "I"
by the withheld "I" is itself a fabric exhibiting that very
weave.
As we proceed with our interpretation of Whitman's
poem, we find that the "I" who is the plaything of the
poet's thought and speech is in fact a dramatization of the
ego in the different stages of its construction.

That is to

say, the represented "I" moves back and forth between the
Imaginary and Symbolic registers, finding a home in neither
sphere.

In turn, it becomes apparent that the withheld self

- the "self" putatively "outside" the poem - corresponds to

Lacan's unconscious, or to that which Lacan frequently
identifies as the Real.

The withheld self, in other words,

comes to signify (in a necessarily mythical gesture) the
underside of the distinction, Imaginary/Symbolic, signifying
that which is repressed by the acquisition of language.

As

a result, the character of "Song of Myself" as a whole is
transformed.

The poem rehearses the distinction addressed

by Rifflet-Lemaire in the following passage:
(the) birth into language and the
utilization of the symbol produce a
disjunction between lived experience and
the sign which replaces it. This
disjunction will become greater over the
years, language being above all the
organ of communication and of reflection
upon a lived experience which it is
often not able to go beyond.
Always
seeking to 'rationalize,' to 'repress'
the lived experience, reflection will
eventually become profoundly divergent
from that lived experience.
In this
sense, we can say with Lacan that the
appearance of language is simultaneous
with the primal repression which
constitutes the unconscious.61
The "I" who is the plaything of the poet's thought - the
sung self - will be best understood as a product of the
organ of communication and reflection, which in turn
guarantees the repression of the "real" self or the locus of
"lived experience."

Consequently, the entire poem will have

to be seen as a mythical re-creation of this fissure in the
psyche, mythical because it is a re-creation in language.
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Earlier we observed that the "Me myself" in section
four of Whitman's poem stands aloof from the world's
activity, a separate and autonomous being.

Now it is

possible for us to read this "Me myself" as an indication
(and necessarily a misrepresentation) of the unconscious; an
unconscious born with the introduction of the subject to
language and the concomitant formation of the reflexive
principle of consciousness.

The "Me myself" contrasts with

the me who is caught up in "the fever of doubtful news" and
swept by the tide of "fitful events," just as the
unconscious contrasts with the public self who is caught up
in the social and cultural symbolism of discourse.
Likewise, that which the poet is ("what I am") stands "apart
from the pulling and hauling" of the world's activity,
situated "both in and out of the game and watching and
wondering at it."

The phrase "Me myself," however, may be

read as more than an indication of the unconscious and its
absence from the realm of public discourse.

The phrase may

also be understood to designate the duality of consciousness
that accompanies the simultaneous birth and repression of
the unconscious.

By virtue of its reflexive structure, the

phrase "Me myself" hints at the twofold nature of
consciousness, and the dialogic positioning of the speaking
subject in relation to himself.

The dual aspect of the

words "Me myself" in effect illustrates the illusion of
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bipartite stability that characterizes the internal
gravitational lock of the conscious self.
Another instance of this self-referential ambiguity can
be found in line 75 of the poem, where Whitman speaks of
himself as "what I am."

The ability of the subject to

confront "what" he is tells of a symmetrical division in
being that is proper to consciousness, meaning that the
subject has reified his own subjective experience enough to
identify its "what-ness."

Meanwhile, the space between the

pronoun and the abstract hypostatization of the subject in
his "what-ness" leads us to think of the space between the
self who is the plaything of his thought and the "I" who
eludes articulation.

As a result of this hiatus, we are

invited to re-examine our conception of the "I" in this
phrase as belonging within the realm of Whitman's
articulable identity, and to acknowledge the profound
fluidity of this "I" as that which links "what" (the
reification of the self) with "am" (the dimension of lived
experience that is uncontained by notions of self and
other).
In section five of "Song of Myself," Whitman embarks on
a dramatization of the Imaginary.

Here the poet establishes

that illusory space in the subject between the "I" and its
symmetrical counterpart, a space which (as we have seen)
tends to collapse and reopen as its terms change places.
Thus we read,
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I believe in you my soul, the other I am
must not abase itself to you,
And you must not be abased to the other.
Loafe with me on the grass, loose the stop
from your throat,
Not words, not music or rhyme I want, not
custom or lecture, not even the best,
Only the lull I like, the hum of your valved
voice.
I mind how once we lay such a transparent
summer morning,
How you settled your head athwart my hips and
gently turned over upon me,
And parted the shirt from my bosom-bone,
and plunged your tongue to my bare-stript
heart,
And reach'd till you felt my beard, and reach'd
till you held my feet.
Any temptation to interpret these words a reflective of a
rational encounter within the poet's mind, suggestive of
consciousness, is dispelled by the erotic overtones in which
this encounter is presented.

Whitman is other to that which

is other to him, not in a logical way, but in the sense of a
sexual attraction that promises to fuse each being with the
other.

Accordingly, we should read this passage as a

fleshly rendition (despite the poet's involvement with his
soul) of the Imaginary phase of the psyche, hinting as it
does at a (sensual) play of reflections.
The Imaginary sense that is established in section five
of "Song of Myself" is reaffirmed in section eight, where
the narrative emphasis at the beginning of the section is on
"the experience of the image."

Thus we read:

"I lift the

gauze and look a long time.... I peeringly view (the
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youngster and the red-faced girl) from the top.... I witness
the corpse with its dabbled hair, I note where the pistol
has fallen."

The explicit identification of the poet's

perceptual relation to things then evolves into a brief
catalog of visions, from the omnibus driver "with his
interrogating thumb" to "the policeman with his star quickly
working his passage to the centre of the crowd."

The first

person drops out of the picture as if more faithfully to
represent the experience

of an immediate confrontation with

the physical world by diminishing the mediating effect of
syntax.
After section eight of "Song of Myself," the Imaginary
aspect of the poem occupies center stage in section 15 as we
encounter a lengthy succession of images, only one of which
includes a reference (a parenthetical reference, at that) to
the poet in his discrete embodiment in the first person.

As

in section eight, the poet withdraws from the work as an
explicit presence and provides us with a stream of unrelated
visions, thereby generating a sense of immediacy that is
unhindered by syntax and mechanical causality.

We as

readers become lost in the details of "malform'd limbs,"
turkey-shoots and piazza walks.
When we turn to section 2 0 of Whitman's poem, we come
upon the following lines:

"In all people I see myself, none

more and not one a barley-corn less,/ And the good or bad I
say of myself I say of them."

In one respect, we can read
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these lines as an extension of the simple reflexivity of
consciousness, with consciousness being understood as a
sustained gravitational lock between the self who speaks or
thinks, and the "plaything" who is invented as a stand-in
for the unconscious.

We can read these lines as a vast

projection of the reflexive relationship that the conscious
individual holds with himself when he stands back and
declares,

"This is what I am."

Simultaneously, however, we

can read these same lines as a representation of the
Imaginary, or of the fluid self-awareness that precedes our
initiation into the Symbolic.

For, as we have seen, the

reflexivity of consciousness harks back to the Imaginary
play of reflections in which the subject does indeed see
himself in all people, that subject being incapable of
distinguishing between himself and that with which he is
confronted.
After asserting in section 20 that he says of others
the good or bad he says of himself, Whitman continues,

"I

know I am solid and sound,/ To me the converging objects of
the universe perpetually flow,/ All are written to me, and I
must get what the writing means."

How, we may ask, do we

move from the pervious identity of the subject who
experiences things Imaginarily to the solid and sound
identity that is articulated in this sentence?

If we draw

on Lacan's reading of Freud, we can account for the movement
as a portrayal of the subject's entrance into the Symbolic,

or more broadly into a language (or writing) which splits
the self into the ego and the unconscious.

In other words,

the ego emerges in the act of writing, the effort to find a
signifying place from which the subject can represent
himself.

That the poet's solid and sound presence at the

center of the converging universe is the ego is shown not
only by the poet's alleged self-sameness and solidity at the
center of the world's converging objects ("The ego is a
projection in whose apparent unity the subject misrecognizes
himself," write Coward and Ellis62), but also by the poet's
experience of these converging objects as writing.

The ego

is that aspect of the subject divided by language that
stands as a representation (a projection) of the undivided
subject, it is the pronoun that gives unified representation
of what is a divided state.

Thus we can say that the poet,

in this sentence, experiences the perpetually flowing things
of the world only insofar as they are mediated through
writing, just as the ego experiences the self insofar as it
is represented or mediated within language.

Indeed, the

poet experiences all things only to the extent that they are
mediated by language or, metaphorically speaking, to the
extent that they are written, for the ego's acquaintance
with the world is defined by its attachment to other
signifiers.
This departure from the Imaginary is pursued in section
22 as Whitman questions the validity of the distinction
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between good and evil, a distinction whose origin Fredric
Jameson has already identified as Imaginary.

Whitman here

examines the dichotomous nature of the ethical and discovers
that it is a falsification of his being.
I am not the poet of goodness only, I do not
decline to be the poet of wickedness also.
What blurt is this about virtue and vice?
Evil propels me and reform of evil propels me,
I stand indifferent,
My gait is no fault-finder's or rejector's gait,
I moisten the roots of all that has grown.

As we will recall, Whitman refuses his "final merit" to
speech in section 25 of the poem.

Prior to this overt

refusal of the poet to give himself to language, Whitman
writes, "Speech is the twin of my vision, it is unequal to
measure itself,/ It provokes me forever, it says
sarcastically,/ Walt you contain enough, why don't you let
it out then?"

Given what we have learned about the

Imaginary and the Symbolic, we can read the claim that
speech is the twin of the poet's vision as an effort to
identify and establish these two registers of subjectivity.
Speech, in Whitman's lines, may be taken to refer to the
Symbolic, while vision may be understood as the Imaginary,
since, as Jameson has already explained, the "Imaginary...
derives from the experience of the image - and of the imago
- and we are meant to retain its spatial and visual
connotations."63

Even as Whitman strives to identify and
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establish the two registers of subjectivity, however, we
should not presume that the poet's goal is full entrance
into the Symbolic - just as it is not a complete recapturing
of Imaginary experience.

The pairing of speech and vision

in section 2 5 of "Song of Myself" should be understood as an
exploration of the proximity and the tension between the
Symbolic and the Imaginary - not as they are schematically
delineated by theory, but as they overlap and support one
another in every attempt to perform a self.
After we are confronted with this pairing of speech and
vision, a fictitious voice hailing from the unconscious
proceeds to tell speech that it "conceives too much of
articulation," the true seed of identity being, ultimately,
"folded" and "protected by frost" in a perpetual winter that
will always inhibit the blossoming of the "true" subject.
Whitman (mis)identifies himself as "underlying causes to
balance them at last," just as we represent the
nonrepresentable dimension of the unconscious in our
theoretical explications of subjectivity.

The poet

announces to speech the inaccessibility of his "real"

(Real)

self to language, even while he is using language:
My final merit I refuse you, I refuse putting
from me what I really am,
Encompass worlds, but never try to encompass me,
I crowd your sleekest and best by simply looking
toward you.
Writing and talk do not prove me,
I carry the plenum of proof and every thing
else in my face,
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With the hush of my lips I wholly confound
the skeptic.
Whitman's refusal of his "true" self to speech at the
near-center of the poem (or his sketching of the
unconscious)

is followed by a return to the Imaginary.

Section 2 6 begins with the words, "Now I will do nothing but
listen,/ To accrue what I hear into this song, to let sounds
contribute toward it," thereby suggesting a view of language
("this song") that is ancillary and passive in relation to
the physical perception of the world.

The poet proceeds to

recount his experience of a wide array of phenomena, until
the first person again fades from the poem in section 33,
withdrawing with the words, "I am afoot with my vision."
Once more, we become lost in a whirl of perceptions as
Whitman describes "pale-green eggs in the dented sand" and
"conical firs."
When the "I" reappears later in section 33, it is as an
integral part of the activity being described.

The poet

does not stand outside the catalog of faces and events,
structuring them from a grammatical distance, but appears to
have attained his identity in the acausal pace of the
Imaginary.

Thus, for example, we read, "I am a free

companion, I bivouac by invading watch-fires,/ I turn the
bridegroom out of bed and stay with the bride myself,/ I
tighten her all night to my thighs and lips."

Even the

Imaginary tone of these lines, however, does not preclude
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our recognition that the "I" who tightens the bride to his
thighs is also

the "I" who is depicted and suspended through

words in a passing act of silence and secrecy.
Finally, when we arrive at section 38 of the poem, we
encounter a crisis that occurs on different levels
simultaneously.

We read as follows:

Enough i enough! enough !
Somehow I have been stunn'd.
Stand back!
Give me a little time beyond my cuff'd head,
slumbers, dreams, gaping,
I discover myself on the verge of a usual mistake.
That
That

I could forget the mockers and insults!
I could forget the trickling tears and the
blows of the bludgeons and hammers!
That I could look with a separate look on my
own crucifixion and bloody crowning.

On one level, the "usual mistake" of which Whitman speaks is
the belief that one can faithfully reconstruct, through the
labor of language, the dimension of lived experience ("the
trickling tears" and "the bludgeons").

The mistake, in this

sense, is the assumption common to us all that we can
address the entire spectrum of our existence with the
detached and egoistic assessments of "a separate look."

We

may wonder, accordingly, if the poet's discovery of himself
on the verge of this "usual mistake" signals a repudiation
of his every effort to contain himself in words.

On another

level, the "usual mistake" of which Whitman speaks here can
be read as the assumption, made throughout his extended act
of self-authoring, that he can contain the split between
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lived experience and its Symbolic reconstruction - even as
he represents that split.

The mistake, in other words, can

also be understood as the endeavor to perform the self along
the lines of an internal division that is destined to
collapse in upon itself.

Looking at the words, "I discover

myself on the verge of a usual mistake," we can conclude
that the act of self-discovery, with its inevitable recourse
to a topography and arrangement of subjective experience, is
by nature poised on the brink of error.
The fact that "Song of Myself" does not end with
section 38 indicates, not that Whitman rejects his critical
(and ambiguous) discovery of himself on the verge of a usual
mistake, but that he accepts the "separate look" as an
essential component of his being and is willing to proceed
with his linguistic re-creation of lived experience - as
well as to accept the ultimately linguistic nature of the
distinction he employs in this re-creation, the distinction
between Symbolic and Imaginary levels of experience.

The

fact that "Song of Myself" continues for fourteen more
sections after this crisis illustrates that Whitman embraces
the inevitable mythicality of his project, and recognizes
that no human being has ever been able to address the
repressed or unconscious aspect of his existence (or the
conjunction of the unconscious and the conscious) without
first casting the separate look of language in the direction
of that inscrutable domain.

"Song of Myself," as a result,
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becomes a rehearsal of the human situation, which is the
paradox of our simultaneous grasp of and alienation from all
that we seek to know.
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55 Language and Materialism. 115.
56Ibid. , 114.
37Ibid. , 115.
58Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis. 161.
59Ibid. , 186.
60Ecrits: aselection. 166.
61Jacques Lacan. 53.
62Language and Materialism. 105.
63,,Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan," 351.
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